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NOTES

THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION AND ITS
APPLICABILITY WHEN A UNION REFUSES TO
PROCESS AN INDIVIDUAL'S GRIEVANCE
I. INTRODUCTION

Suppose that one is employed by an employer having a collective bargaining agreement with a union representing all of
the non-salaried employees. The agreement provides that no
employee shall be discharged except for "just cause," and it
also sets up a four-step grievance procedure culminating in
arbitration. Suppose further, that the employee is discharged
and he files a grievance with his union claiming that his discharge was not for "just cause" and was, therefore, in violation
of the collective bargaining agreement.
The object of this note is to explore the doctrine of the duty
of fair representation as a possible avenue of relief available
to such an employee when his union either refuses to institute
the grievance machinery in his behalf, or when it prosecutes his
grievance only through the first few steps of the grievance
procedure and refuses to press it further.

II. PossIBri

ALTERNATIVES FOR RnLFy

A. Action to Compel the Employer to Arbitrate Under Section
9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.
From the language of the first proviso of section 9(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act 1 it would appear that such
employee has the right to take his unprocessed grievance di2
rectly to his employer and have it adjusted.
Professor Archibald Cox argues, however, that the 9(a)
proviso creates no such affirmative right in the individual
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) (hereinafter cited at
NLRA) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). After giving the majority union
exclusive bargaining capacity, section 9(a) is qualified by the following proviso:
Provided, That any individual employee or group of employees shall have

the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of the collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given the

opportunity to be present at such adjustment.

2. See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitra-

tion, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 362, 394 (1962).
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employee but that it merely provides that the employer's duty
to bargain with the majority union is not violated if he chooses
to hear and adjust grievances with individual employees.8 The
Cox approach was accepted by the Second Circuit in 19614 and
by the Sixth Circuit in 1965. 5 Further, the Supreme Court has
given seeming acceptance to Cox's view, although never expressly mentioning section 9 (a).
[W]e do not agree that the individual employee has an
absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration
regardless of the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.0
Thus, it would appear that the 9(a) proviso is of no help to
an employee whose union has refused to process his grievance.
B. Action Against Employer for Breaching the Collective
Agreement under Section 801 (a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act.
Because section 9(a) of the NLRA does not give the employee any right to have his grievance arbitrated, his next
alternative is to bring suit against his employer for breaching
the collective agreement.
A significant development in this area is the case of TextlZe
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills.7 There the Supreme Court held that Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act s authorizes the federal courts to fashion a body
of federal labor law based upon national labor policy. In a
later case the Court held, by reversing an earlier decision,9 that
section 301 gives the federal courts jurisdiction to hear complaints by individual employees against their employer for
3. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAzv. L. REv. 601, 621-24

(1956).

4. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962) cited with approval in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
5. See Broniman v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 353 F2d 559, 562 (6th Cir.
1965) cert. denied, 384 U.S. 907 (1966). Cf. Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40
N.J. 51, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
6. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
7. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) (hereinafter cited

as LMRA) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).

9. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.

Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 10 The stage
was, therefore, set for a case-by-case determination by the courts
of the extent to which federal labor law protects an individual
employee whose union refuses to press his grievance which is
based upon the employer's alleged breach of contract.
C. Action Against the Union under the Duty of Fair Representation.
The last alternative of relief available to the hypothetical
employee is to sue his union for failure to process his grievance.
There is a chance, although very slight, that he may be able to
show that the union committed a breach of its "duty of fair
representation," for which he is entitled to a remedy.
A recent Supreme Court case, Vaca v. Sipes," has increased
the importance of the duty of fair representation by requiring
an individual employee to show such a breach before he can sue
his employer for violation of the collective agreement. The ramifications of this decision will be explored following a discussion
of the duty of fair representation in the context of grievance
handling.
III. THn Dury oF FAIm

REPImESETATIO

A. Generally

In the early years of national labor policy, sweeping powers
were given to bargaining representatives once they were designated by a majority of the workers in a bargaining unit. To
further the federal ideal of preserving industrial harmony, the
individual employee was required to surrender completely his
right of self-representation to the union which represented him.
It soon became apparent, however, that the individual worker
was susceptible to frequent abuse at the hands of the union
and that the unions' power needed to be limited. This limit
had its genesis in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad12
and was termed "the duty of fair representation." There the
union had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement which
deprived Negroes of their seniority rights. The Court held that
because the Railway Labor Act" allows the majority union to
10.
11.
12.
13.

Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
386 U.S. 171, 185-87 (1967).
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
Railway Labor Act 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
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be the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees
in the unit, the Act, therefore, imposes upon that union the
duty to represent all employees in the unit fairly. In a famous
analogy the Court stated:
We think the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the
statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a
duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the
craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to
give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it
legislates.14
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act,1 5 which
confers exclusive bargaining power upon a majority union,
also imposes the duty of fair representation on that union.16
Thus, both the RLA and the NLRA have been read as imposing this duty upon the majority union although such duty is
explicit in neither statute.
In Conley v. Gibson'1 the Court held that the duty of fair
representation embraces the administration, as well as the negotiation, of the collective bargaining agreement. Based upon
the above premise, the courts have recognized that this duty
prohibits the majority union from discriminating between its
members and non-members by refusing to press the latters'
grievances."' A union, therefore, can commit a breach of its
duty by its conduct in handling employees' grievances. What
kind of union conduct must the employee prove in order to make
out a case of breach of duty against the union?
B. JudicW Standards
In the Steee case the Court gave some hint at a standard to
be applied in finding a breach of the duty of fair representation
by stating that the union must exercise its power "without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." 19
14. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
15. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). The duty of fair repre-

sentation is to be found (implied) in the language of section 9(a) which makes
the majority union the excluive bargaining representative for the unit.

16. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964), rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 935 (1964); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l
Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), reversing per curiam, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.
1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v.

NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (dictum).

17. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
18. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
19. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
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While this language appeared to afford significant protection
20
to the individual, the Court, in Ford Motor (o. V. Huffman,
restricted application of the fair representation doctrine to only
the most blatant cases of union misconduct by stating:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to
which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees. .

.

. The mere existence of such dif-

ferences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.
A wide range of reasonablenessmust be allowed a statutory
bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents
subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
21
purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
This so-called good faith discretion test was before the Court
in HumphArey v. Moore22 in which there was an action against
the union and employer by an employee. The essence of his
claim against the union was that it had breached its duty of
fair representation by the manner in which it had handled his
grievance. Finding that there had been no breach of the duty,
the Court said:
Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous
grievances which would only clog the grievance process,
so it must be free to take a position on the not so frivolous
disputes.2 3
In Vaca v. Sipes, 24 perhaps the most significant duty of fair
representation case since Steele, the Court reaffirmed the good
faith standard and stated:
A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation
occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the
collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith.2 5
20. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).

21. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
22. 375 U.S. 335 (1964), rehzearing denied, 376 U.S. 935 (1964).

23. Id. at 349.
24. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,
368 F2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88 S.Ct. 53 (1967).
25. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (emphasis added).
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Whether the union has acted in good faith depends upon the
facts of each case.20
The earliest case on breach of the duty of fair representation
with regard to grievance handling was a 1945 Fifth Circuit
decision in which the court recognized that refusing to process
the grievances of non-union members in the bargaining unit
would violate the duty.27 Later, Professor Archibald Cox expressed belief that the union would be "guilty of a breach of
duty if it refused to press a justifiable grievance either because
of laziness, prejudice or unwillingness to expend money on behalf of employees who are not members of the union." 28 Recently, the Fifth Circuit held that a union commits a breach of
its duty of fair representation by refusing to process the grievances of its Negro members.29 Most cases against unions for
refusal to process, however, involve no conduct so blatant as
racial discrimination. The good faith discretion standard appears inadequate to protect the individual employee from the
more subtle forms of union misconduct in refusing to press
grievances.
The Sixth Circuit has held that when a union, because of its
own mistake in interpreting the collective bargaining agreement,
refuses to press a grievance, there is no breach of its duty if
the union's refusal is made in good faith.30 Further, when a
complaint alleges only that the employee was "discriminated"
against, it fails to charge the union with "intent" to discriminate,
and the union should be granted a summary judgment.8 1 When
a union, however, agrees to process a grievance only upon condition that the employee sign a statement releasing the union
from damage liability, such a "conditional" refusal to process
is a breach of the union's duty.82 Because a threat by a union
26. See Trotter v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees, 309 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1962); Pekar v. Local 181, United Brewery
Workers, 311 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1962).
27. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
28. Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8
LAD. L.J. 850, 858 (1957).
29. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
(1966), cert. denied, 88 S.Ct. 53 (1967).
30. Pekar v. Local 181, United Brewery Workers, 311 F.2d 628 (6th Cir.

1962).

31. Palmieri v. United Steelworkers, 270 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Pa. 1967). See
also Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1963).
32. Confectionery & Tobacco Drivers & Warehousemen's Local 805 v.
NLRB, 312 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1963).
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to breach its duty of fair representation is a breach in itself,88
it would appear that a threat made in bad faith not to process
a grievance could likewise breach the duty.
One of the most effective defenses than can be presented by
a union charged with breaching its duty in refusing to press a
grievance, is that, in good faith, it believed the grievance was
not meritorious. Such a defense is so effective because "a breach
of the duty of fair representation is not established merely by
proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious... ."84 The
employee must also show "arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on the
part of the Union in processing his grievance." 85 Placing this
burden of proving the union's bad faith upon the plaintiff makes
his case extremely difficult. The Supreme Court has stated that
the union's bad faith may be proved by showing that it has
"ignored [the plaintiff's] complaint or ... processed the griev-

ance in a perfunctory manner." 3 6 The union, however, can
apparently overcome such an allegation of bad faith merely
by proving that its decision not to press the grievance was
reached only after thorough investigation. 8t Making it even
more difficult for the plaintiff to show bad faith is a Fifth
Circuit decision saying that courts should give union grievance
decisions "a presumption of honesty and fairness.""" Further,
one court has said that the union has a duty to screen grievances 8" while another has said that "the union must proceed
with caution in processing individual grievances . ..."40
33. Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F2d 137 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
34. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967). See also Local 12, United
Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88
S. Ct. 53 (1967); Palmieri v. United Steelvorkers, 270 F. Supp. 5, 11 (W.D.
Pa. 1967).
35. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967). See also Local 12, United
Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88
S. Ct. 53 (1967); Palmieri v. United Steelworkers, 270 F. Supp. 5, 11 (W.D.
Pa. 1967).
36. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967).
37. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) ; Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct 53 (1967);
Freedman v. National Maritime Union, 347 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 917 (1966) ; Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 273 F.2d 614

(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960); Hill v. Aro Corp. 275 F.

Supp. 482 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Palmieri v. United Steelworkers, 270 F. Supp.
5 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Brandt v. United States Lines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 982

(S.D.N.Y. 1964).

38. Stewart v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 294 F.2d 7, 11 (5th Cir. 1961).

39. Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 273 F2d 614 (4th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
40. Foltz v. Harding Glass Co., 263 F. Supp. 959, 964 (W.D. Ark. 1967).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South
Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
REViEw

[Vol. 20

Thus, the union is given a great deal of discretion in handling
grievances subject only to the limitation that this discretion be
exercised in good faith. Such a test weighs the odds heavily
in favor of the union in fair representation cases brought for
refusal to process because of the difficulty of showing the
union's bad faith. The courts justify this apparent inequity
on the ground that judicial interference with union discretion
over grievance handling "would surely weaken the collective
bargaining and grievance processes." 1
42
The good faith discretion test has drawn abundant criticism.
One reason that the courts have failed to develop a more adequate standard may be that they lack sufficient familiarity with
the realities of industrial life to detect the many ways a union
can abuse the rights of the individual employee under the
guise of protecting "the interests of the majority." The National Labor Relations Board, because of its expertise in the
area of administration of collective agreements, may be the
43
more logical body to formulate workable standards.
IV. Timi DUTY OF

FAIR PRESENTATION AS AN

UNFAn LABOR PRACTICE: PRE-EM-MON

In Humphrey v. Moore44 the Supreme Court implied that an
allegation that the union breached its duty of fair representation
may also state a cause of action under section 301 of the LMRA45
for violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Mr. Justice
41. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964), rehearing denied, 376
U.S. 935 (1964).
42. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Duty of Fair Representation: Individual Rights
Under Collective Contracts-What Should The Rule Be?, 15 LAB. L.J. 598,
599 (1964); Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIcH.
L. RE. 1435, 1485 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protection For Critical Job
Interests: Union-Management Autonomy Versus Employee Autonomy, 13
RUTGrRS L. REv. 631, 655 (1959) ; Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation
Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REv. 373, 375-76, 389 (1965) ; Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem,
24 MD. L. REV. 233, 287 (1964) ; Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L. J. 1327,
1339, 1357 (1958) ; Note, Refusal to Process a Grievance, The NLRB, and the
Duty of Fair Representation: A Plea For Pre-emption, 26 U. PnTr. L. Rv.
539, 601-02 (1965) ; Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under
Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L. J. 1215, 1234 (1964).
43. See note, Refusal to Process a Grievance, The NLRB, and the Duty
of Fair Representation: A Plea for Pre-emption, 26 U. PiTT. L. Rxv. 593
(1965).
44. 375 U.S. 335 (1964), rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 935 (1964).
45. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
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Goldberg concurred in the result, but he disagreed with any
theory that when a union breaches its duty, it also violates the
collective agreement. His disagreement was based upon a belief
that the duty of fair representation is "derived not from the collective bargaining contract but from the National Labor Relations Act ...

"46

Humphrey, therefore, raises the question of whether an individual employee, under section 301, can sue his union for
breaching its duty without also alleging that the employer has
violated the collective bargaining agreement. It has been suggested that "Humphrey might be interpreted to mean that
where a cause of action otherwise is alleged under 301, then
the fair representation issue may also be litigated, in the nature
of ancilliary jurisdiction." 47 When a cause of action, however,
is not otherwise alleged under 301, i.e., the individual sues his
union for breach of the duty and does not also sue his employer
for breach of contract, then the fair representation issue might
not be allowed to be litigated under section 301. This is because
section 301(a) gives federal courts jurisdiction over "suits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization . . ., 4 8 and Goldberg is possibly correct in saying
a breach of the duty by a union does not violate the collective
agreement.
No case has squarely faced the issue of whether an employee
can sue his union under section 301(a) for breaching its duty
without also suing his employer for violating the collective
agreement. If, however, it is held that such a "pure" breach
of duty suit against the union cannot be brought under section
301(a), then the courts' jurisdiction over such cases may appear
to be "pre-empted" by that of the NLRB.
In the 1962 case of Miranda Fuel

Co. 49

the NLRB, for the

first time, held that a union commits an unfair labor practice
when it breaches its duty of fair representation. There the
Board reasoned that the concept of fair representation, which
46. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964) (concurring opinion),

rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 935 (1964).
47. Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo.
L. REv. 373, 387 (1965)

(emphasis added).

But see Mandel v. Highway &

Local Motor Freight Drivers, Local 707, 246 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
48. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1964) (emphasis added).
49. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
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has been implied"0 from section 9(a) of the NLRA, 51 gives
rise to a corresponding "right" of employees under section 752
to be free from "unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment" 3
from their union. Further, since section 8(b) (1) (A) 54 prohibits restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights, a union commits an 8(b) (1) (A) unfair labor
practice when it violates the duty of fair representation.55
On appeal, the Second Circuit" denied enforcement of the
Board order in Miranda;however, the Fifth Circuit has recently
followed the Miranda doctrine. 57 There the court found that
the union had breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to process the grievances of its Negro members. More
important, however, was the court's reliance upon the Miranda
doctrine in holding that the union's breach of the duty constituted an 8(b) (1) (A) unfair labor practice.5 Significantly,
the Supreme Court in 196759 gave implied acceptance to the
Miranda doctrine by apparently approving of the above-mentioned Fifth Circuit case. 0°
The implication of the Miranda doctrine is that the NLRB
now has jurisdiction of cases against unions for breach of the
duty of fair representation because such a breach also constitutes
an unfair labor practice. Recognizing this, the next inquiry is
whether the Board's jurisdiction is "exclusive;" i.e., whether
judicial cognizance of fair representation cases has been "preempted" by Board jurisdiction.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon:61 the
Supreme Court laid down the general rule that neither state
nor federal courts have jurisdiction over suits directly involving
"activity [which] is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the
50. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), reversing per
curiamn, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953) ; Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (dictum).
51. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
52. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
53. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
54. NLRA § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
55. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
56. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
57. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 53 (1967).
58. Id. at 19-22.
59. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178 (1967).
60. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966) ; cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 53 (1967).
61. 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
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Act .... 62 Thus, the Board is said to have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases; i.e., the Board's jurisdiction "pre-empts" judicial cognizance of unfair labor practice
cases.
Since a union which breaches its duty of fair representation
thereby commits an unfair labor practice, it would appear, applying the Garmon pre-emption rule, that the NLRB would now
have exclusive jurisdiction of fair representation cases.
The Supreme Court recently faced this pre-emption question
in the Vaca case. 63 There the Court stated various exceptions 4
to the Garmon principle of exclusive Board jurisdiction and
said that such exceptions
demonstrate that the decision to pre-empt federal and state
court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend
upon the nature of the particular interest being asserted and
the effect upon the administration of national labor policies
of concurrent judicial and administrative remedies. 6
The Court then held that the doctrine of pre-emption was not
applicable to that case. While the Court did not expressly
state that pre-emption never applies to fair representation suits,
this was implied by the language used.6 6 Whether this conclusion is correct has no real effect on the usual refusal to
process cases in which the employer is being sued under LMRA
section 301(a) 6 7 for violating the collective bargaining agree-

ment and the union is joined as a defendant for wrongfully
refusing to press the grievance. This is because the Garmon
pre-emption rule has "no application to §301 suits." '8 That
is, courts have jurisdiction under section 301(a) over suits by
individuals for violation of collective bargaining agreements,
regardless of the fact that the conduct complained of is also an
unfair labor practice. Thus, when the employee sues his em62. Id. at 245. The Court is referring to the NLRA.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
Id. at 179-81.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 180-81 where the Court stated:

A primary justification for the pre-emption doctrine-the

need to avoid

conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area and the
desirability of leaving the development of such rules to the administrative
agency created by Congress for that purpose-is not applicable to cases
involving alleged breaches of the union duty of fair representation.
67. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
68. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967). The Court cited Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) for the rule stated.
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ployer for breach of the collective agreement under 301 (a) and
joins his union for breaching its duty in refusing to press the
grievance, there will be no pre-emption.0 9 The courts and the
NLRB, therefore, have concurrent jurisdiction over the fair
representation aspect of the grievant's case.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the employee who
alleges that his union has wrongfully refused to process his
grievance, which is based upon the employer's violation of the
collective agreement, now has a choice of forums. He can bring
action in the court using section 301(a) of the LMIRA *0 as a
basis for jurisdiction, alleging that the employer violated the
collective agreement. On the other hand, he can file charges
with the NLRB alleging that the union's conduct amounted to
a breach of the duty of fair representation and an unfair labor
practice.
One advantage of filing charges before the NLRB is that the
individual would not be required to pay any litigation expense.
Another would appear to be that he could have his case resolved
much faster before the Board than before the courts. Further,
the fact that the Board is expert in the area of labor relations
makes it probable that it could better elucidate and apply
71
standards for fair representation cases.

V.

REMEDIES

A. Judiciad
When an individual has a grievance based upon his employer's
alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement and the
union refuses to press it, a suit against the employer and union
under section 301 may give rise to various remedies.
The Supreme Court has said by way of dicta, that when the
employee's action is based upon the employer's alleged breach
of contract plus the union's alleged wrongful refusal to press
his grievance, "an order compelling arbitration should be viewed
as one of the available remedies when a. breach of the union's
duty is proved."7 2 When there is no allegation, however, that
the union's refusal was in bad faith, no order compelling arbi69. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-88 (1967).
70. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
71. See Murphy, The Dity of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30
Mo. L. REV. 373, 384 (1965); Note, Refusal to Process a Grievance, The
NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Representation: A Plea for Pre-emption, 26

U. PxTr. L. IEv. 593, 618 (1965).
72. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967).
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tration will be given.'73 Further, there is doubt whether the
union would energetically prosecute the arbitration on behalf
of an employee to whom it has lost a law suit.
Damages are likewise available in a section 301 suit by an
individual against his employer for breach of contract and
against his union for wrongful refusal to process his grievance.
The Supreme Court has stated that the plaintiff's recovery
should be "apportion[ed]

. . . between the employer and the

4
union according to the damage caused by the fault of each."'1
Damages caused solely by the employer's breach of the collective agreement, therefore, should not be charged to the union.
However, the union should be charged with any increases in
the damage resulting from the employer's breach as long as
such increases are caused by the union's wrongful refusal to
process.
The Court, recognizing that other remedies are available to
an individual employee in a section 301 action, has stated
that where the arbitrable issues have been substantially resolved during the trial, "equitable relief '175 may be granted.
When the employee's claim is based upon wrongful discharge,
such relief could mean reinstatement with back pay.

B. Administrative
As has been mentioned earlier, since a union's breach of its
duty of fair representation is also an unfair labor practice, the
aggrieved employee may choose to file charges with the NLRB
against his union rather than to sue his employer for breach
of contract under section 301.
The remedies available to the individual employee in an unfair labor practice case before the Board are similar to those he
could receive from the courts, except that the Board does not
order damages.
The NLRB can compel arbitration when the union has
breached its duty by refusing to process the individual's griev76
ance in bad faith.
73. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d

179 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Proctor & Gamble Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962).

74. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
75. Id. at 196.
76. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 53 (1967).
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In Miranda,7 which held that a union violates section 8(b)
(1) (A) of the NLRA-7 upon committing a breach of its duty of
fair representation, the Board also held that an employer who
"participates"7 0 in such arbitrary union conduct violates section
8(a) (1).so It would appear, therefore, that in a case in which
both the union and the employer are found guilty of an unfair
labor practice, the Board could order reinstatement with back
pay. When an employer has not "participated" in the union's
breach of duty, however, Board orders affecting him (such as
reinstatement) could not issue.

VI. ExEuusToN IN 301 AcTiox
In order to avoid any problems of jurisdiction, the individual
whose union has refused to press his grievance should sue not
only his union, but also his employer for breach of contract.
Such a joinder will eliminate any difficulty arising from the
defendant union's dismissal motions for lack of court jurisdiction
based on the doctrine of pre-emption. This pre-emption problem of jurisdiction, however, is only the first major hurdle that
the individual must overcome in his section 301 action against
his employer. The second, and the most formidable, is the prerequisite that he prove he has "exhausted" his contract remedies.
Pervading all suits by individuals for breach of a collective
agreement containing a set grievance procedure is the policy that
use of such agreed upon methods for settling labor disputes
should be encouraged by the courts. It was, therefore, established
in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox8 l that, while an individual
may bring suit against his employer under LMRA section 301,82
he first "must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure . . .,83 as set out by the collective bargaining agreement,
and "must afford the union the opportunity to act on his
behalf." 8 ' Thus, if the individual never attempts to have his
union prosecute his grievance, this is a ground for granting the
77. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
78. NLRA § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
79. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
80. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
81. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
82. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
83. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) (emphasis in
original).
84. Id. at 653.
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employer's motion to dismiss.8 5 The more usual case, however,
is the one in which the individual has requested that the union
process his grievance and it either refuses to prosecute or drops
the grievance after pursuing it through only the initial stages
of the grievance procedure. The Court in Maddox recognized
this situation but refused to say whether the union's refusal
to press the individual's grievance was sufficient "exhaustion." 8
In Vaca; v. Sipes,8 7 however, the Court addressed itself to this
question and found that, in order to overcome the defense of
failure to exhaust, the plaintiff must show more than merely
the union's refusal to press his claim. He must show that he
"has been prevented from exhausting his contractual remedies
by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance." 8
That is, he must "prove that the union .

.

. breached its duty

of fair representation in its handling of [his] grievance."8 9
Although this Vaca exhaustion rule can be supported by earlier
lower court decisions,90 it drew a strong dissent from Mr. Justice
Black. He said that such a rule seriously impairs the individual
employee "when he seeks direct judicial relief for his... breachof-contract claim against his employer."9 1
Since 1962, federal courts have had jurisdiction to hear cases
under section 301(a) of the LMRA 92 brought by individuals
against their employer for violation of the collective bargaining
agreement.9 3 By now imposing upon the individual the burden
of proving not only the contract violation, but also bad faith
85. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965) ; Doty v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 362 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1966); Woody v. Sterling Alum-

inium Prods., Inc., 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957
(1967) ; Henderson v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 290 F.2d 677 (4th Cir.

1961).
86. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) in which the
Court stated that "if the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses
the individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of redress then
available."
87. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
88. Id. at 185 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 186.
90. See Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 273 F2d 614 (4th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960); Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 214
(D.S.C. 1967) ; Fiore v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 596 (M.D. Pa.
1966); Brandt v. United States Lines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). But see Simmons v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.
Pa. 1967); Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684 (N.D.
IIl. 1965).
91. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 203 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
92. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
93. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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on the part of the union in refusing to press his claim, such
individual suits will all but be eliminated. This is because a
showing that the union refused to press in bad faith is nearly
impossible to make since the union is given such a wide range
of discretion in the handling of grievances.9 4 Thus, the practical
effect of the rule of exhaustion in Vaca will likely be to deny
a remedy to an employee, even if he has a meritorious grievance
against his employer for violation of the contract.9 5
Reasons for this extended exhaustion rule, weighing the odds
against the individual in his breach of contract action against
his employer, do not abound. The Court apparently sees a
distinct need for allowing the union a great deal of discretion
in dealing with borderline grievances as they arise.
The three reasons90 given by the majority in Vaca for allowing the union such great discretion over grievance handling
were attacked by Black in his dissent.97 The majority's first
reason was that frivolous grievances would be ended prior to
time-consuming and costly arbitration. Black argues, however,
that many grievances that are not frivolous will be stymied
by the new Vaca exhaustion rule. Second, the majority said that
allowing the union to settle grievances prior to arbitration will
assure consistent treatment of major problem areas in interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Black contends,
however, that some serious grievances involve no major problem
in contract interpretation. Finally, the majority said that such
wide discretion furthers the interests of the union, but Black
contends that the union's interest is not undermined by requiring
it to process all "serious grievances to a conclusion or by allowing the injured employee to sue his employer after he has given
98
the union a chance to act on his behalf."
Black is not alone in his concern for the individual who
has a serious grievance which his union refuses to press. Pro94. See note 41 supra.
95. This, in fact, could have happened in Vaca v. Sipes in which the employee failed in his charge of breach of the duty of fair representation. Because of this failure, he would, according to the majority, also fail to withstand the employer's exhaustion defense in a section 301 action for breach of
contract. Thus, the employee has no remedy even though, in the trial in the
state court, the jury had found that his grievance was meritorious.

96. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
97. Id. at 209-10 (dissenting opinion). For a more thorough criticism of
the reasons usually given for allowing the union such wide discretion over

grievances, see Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca
v. Sipes, 77 YALE L. J. 559 (1968).
98. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 210 (1967).
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fessor Blumrosen contends that grievances based upon "critical
job interests"9 9 should not be allowed to be disposed of by the
union in good faith but should be heard on their merits.10 0
The good faith discretion test does not adequately protect
the employee's basic relation to his job. Discharge and
seniority cases involving critical job interests should be
heard on their merits in some impartial forum. The employee should be allowed to prove that his claim is meritorious. The union would then be required to demonstrate
why it rejected his claim .... This pattern of proof might

make the duty of fair representation more meaningful. 10 '
Blumrosen also believes that "there is no evidence that the collective bargaining process would grind to a halt if individual
employees were allowed legal protection for their critical job
interests.' 10 2 Certainly, in view of the new Vaca exhaustion
rule and its probable harmful impact upon individual suits
against employers for violations of collective bargaining agreements, Blumrosen's ideas merit consideration.
VII. CoOLcwsIoN

The doctrine of the duty of fair representation is of little help
to an employee whose union has refused to process his grievance
unless the union's refusal was blatantly intended to discriminate
against him. Such a realization casts serious doubt on the
Court's statement in IVaea that "the duty of fair representation
has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct
against individuals ...."103

The Court in TVaca cleared up the question of pre-emption
that pervaded fair representation cases by holding that the
Board and courts should exercise concurrent jurisdiction. However, the Court imposed a new rule of exhaustion to be applied
99. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L. REv.
1435, 1485 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests:
Union-Management Autonomy Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RuGaRS L.
REV. 631, (1959). These cases involving "critical job interests," suggests
Blumrosen, include disputes over discharges, wages and seniority.
100. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionisn: Admininstrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L.
REv. 1435, 1485 (1963).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1494.
103. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
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as a prerequisite to suits by individual employees against their
employers for violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Not only must the employee show that he has first attempted
use of the grievance procedure set out by the contract, but
he must now also show that his union has refused to press his
grievance in breach of its duty of fair representation. Placing
the burden upon the individual of taking on both his employer
and his union should cause a serious reduction in individual
suits under section 301. The Court apparently feels that such
a rule preserves the integrity of the grievance procedure as a
method of settling labor disputes.
The individual employee must retain certain rights under a
collective bargaining agreement-otherwise he would never have
been given the opportunity to sue his employer for breach of
that agreement. 10 4 The Vaca exhaustion rule, however, effectively erases such rights by preventing a suit by an employee
against his employer for violation of the collective agreement
from going to trial on the merits. The Court's desire to protect
the collective bargaining process has dealt, therefore, a stinging
blow to the individual employee.
JAns J. BAMWn, III

104. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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